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Underdeveloped  financial  markets  and  periods  of  high  inflation  have  stimulated  dollarization  and 
currency  substitution  in  the  economies  of  Central  Asia.  Some  authors  argue  that  the  latter  can  pose 
serious obstacles for the effective conduct of monetary policy and can affect households' welfare. This 
study uses a model with money-in-the-utility function to estimate the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign currencies in three economies of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic 
and  Tajikistan.  Utility  derived  from  holding  money  balances  is  represented  by  a  CES  function  with 
money holdings denominated in two currencies. The residents are assumed to diversify their monetary 
holdings  due  to  instability  of  the  domestic  currency.  The  steady  state  analysis  reveals  that  though 
currency substitution decreases governments' seigniorage revenue, holding foreign money can be welfare 
generating if domestic currency depreciates vis-à-vis the currencies in which households' foreign balances 
holdings  are  denominated.  De-dollarization  can  only  be  achieved  through  further  macroeconomic 
stabilization that will bring price and exchange rate stability. Financial sector development will also 
decrease currency substitution through the provision of reliable financial instruments and the gaining of 
public confidence. 
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Currency substitution, or the use of foreign currency to ￿nance transactions,by domestic residents
has been a widespread phenomenon in emerging market and transition economies. During the
1990s, currency substitution and dollarization started to increase rapidly in former centrally planned
economies, and remained an important characteristic of these economies for most of the 1990s and
2000s.1 This study investigates the importance of currency substitution in a group of transition
economies in Central Asia and estimates the degree of substitutability between domestic currency
and foreign currency in these economies. This empirical analysis contributes to an understanding
of the economic importance of currency substitution in three economies - Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan.Moreover, the study examines the implications of currency substitution for
seigniorage revenues of the government and its welfare cost.
The countries of Central Asia have experienced important structural socio-economic and political
transformation related to the demolition of old administrative systems and building new institutions
of the free market.2 Building a market economy required economic liberalization, including price
liberalization and gradual capital markets decontrol. Price liberalization resulted in an accelerated
pace of in￿ation and rapid depreciation of newly introduced national currencies. The weak positions
of domestic legal tenders and their decreasing purchasing power led to a ￿ight from national money
and an increase in foreign currency holdings by residents. Currency substitution was a result of the
general economic instability and undermined the credibility of the domestic money.3 Moreover, the
rudimentary ￿nancial sector institutions were not able to provide households with reliable ￿nancial
instruments for saving in domestic currency.Holding foreign currency (mostly U.S. dollars) thus
became a way to hedge against the risk of in￿ation and depreciation of the local currency.
Macroeconomic stabilization in Central Asian economies at the end of the 1990s brought down
in￿ation rates and thus helped local currencies regain credibility. This has not, however, reversed the
process of dollarization. There is no estimated measure of the cash holdings denominated in U.S.
dollars in Central Asia.The level of foreign currency denominated deposits is thus used to re￿ect the
importance of currency substitution. Several factors have in￿uenced the population’s decision to hold
foreign currency.4 Among them are the memory of past in￿ation and instability, uncertainty about
future economic developments, underdeveloped ￿nancial markets and weak con￿dence towards local
commercialbanks. Forexample, only5percentofthepopulationintheKyrgyzRepublicholddeposits
1See, for example, Baliæo, Bennett and Borensztein (1999), Feige (2003)
2See, G￿rgen, et al. (1999)
3Currency substitution and dollarization are faced by most developing and transition economies. For example, Sahay
and VØgh (1995), Savastano (1996), Feige (2003), Havrylyshyn and Beddies (2003) studied groups of countries in Latin
America, Central and Eastern Europe, and former Soviet republics and provided evidence that macroeconomic instability
and high rates of in￿ation are major reasons for currency substitution and dollarization in these economies.
4The factors that motivate holding a foreign currency are based on evidence from surveys done by the Austrian National
Bank in CESEE countries (see Ritzberger-Gr￿nwald and Stix, 2007, Dvorsky et al., 2008, Stix, 2008) and the study by
Zoryan (2005) on dollarization in Armenia.
1in banks.5 The income and wealth of the population is also an important factor affecting dollarization.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic remain the poorest countries in the transition region. The data on
foreign currency denominated assets, foreign capital ￿ows, and in￿ows of remittances from abroad
indicate that there is a signi￿cant in￿ow of foreign currency in the economies of Central Asia. 6 The
in￿ows of remittances constitute not only a source of foreign currency but also an important source
of ￿nance. Households use foreign money as a savings instrument, keeping certain amounts in cash.
Very often the foreign currency (in particular, the U.S. dollar) is a currency of denomination for prices
on big ticket items (eg. real estate, cars, equipment). The issue of currency substitution and its policy
implications thus remain important.
In the present study the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign currencies in
Central Asian economies is estimated. For this purpose an empirical estimation of an optimizing
model with money-in-the-utility function is performed. The nonlinear Euler equations that
characterize the ￿rst-order-conditions of optimization by a representative consumer are estimated
using the General Method of Moments (GMM) procedure as proposed by Hansen (1982). After
the key parameters are estimated, they are used for further comparison of steady states with
different degrees of dollarization and different in￿ation rates in order to examine the implications
for seigniorage revenues and the welfare loss incurred by households due to holding foreign money
balances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on currency substitution.
Section 3 brie￿y presents the economic background and recent developments in the economies of
Central Asia. Section 4 presents the theoretical model. Section 5 discusses the data used in the study.
Section 6 presents the empirical results. Sections 7 and 8 examine the seigniorage losses and welfare
implications of currency substitution in Central Asia, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Currency Substitution: Theoretical Background and Empirical
Evidence
The problem of currency substitution and dollarization has been extensively studied in the economic
literature. Manydevelopingeconomieshaveexperiencedhighlevelsofdollarizationfollowingperiods
of macroeconomic instability.7 In this study, no formal distinction is made between dollarization and
currency substitution and the two terms are used interchangeably.8
Dollarization in transition economies is an important issue to address for several reasons. First,
5EBRD Transition Report, 2008
6See Table B 1 in Appendix B.
7See, for example, Rennhack and Nozaki (2006) who discuss the magnitude and trends in dollarization in different
developing regions.
8Calvo and VØgh (1992) report that currency substitution is very often referred to as dollarization in economies with
high in￿ation episodes.
2dollarization might pose obstacles for an effective monetary policy by in￿uencing the monetary
transmission mechanism. Sahay and VØgh (1995), Baliæo, Bennett, and Borensztein (1999),
Havrylyshyn and Beddies (2003) and other authors argue that dollarization makes the conduct of
monetary policy more challenging as it in￿uences the stability of the money demand and makes
exchange rates more volatile. HorvÆth and Maino (2006) study the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy in Belarus, and discuss the ways in which dollarization affects different channels
of monetary policy transmission. On the one hand, a high level of dollarization brings more volatile
exchange rates and a stronger pass-through from exchange rates to prices. On the other hand, the
interest rate channel might become weaker as holding foreign currency denominated assets makes
local economic agents less sensitive to changes in interest rates on domestic currency assets.
Furthermore,dollarization affects the ability of governments to earn revenue from seigniorage.
Bufman and Leiderman (1992) study dollarization in Israel, and ￿nd that dollarization and currency
substitution may affect the ability of a government to ￿nance its budget de￿cit. They show that small
increases in dollarization have resulted in large seigniorage losses in Israel. Harrison and Vymyatnina
(2007) argue that currency substitution can also preclude a government from using an in￿ationary tax
to ￿nance its expenditure programs, as the spending power is limited by the willingness of domestic
residents to hold domestic currency. They claim that foreign currency cash transactions can encourage
tax evasion and shift the economy to underground activities.
Finally, some authors argue that currency substitution might affect the ability of central banks
to provide accurate macroeconomic forecasts. Thus, in the context of dollarization and currency
substitution effective implementation of an in￿ation targeting regime might be affected as well.
Though Leiderman, Maino and Parrado (2006) ￿nd that in Latin American economies dollarization
can still allow an in￿ation targeting regime to be implemented, the latter might still be an important
argument against dollarization in the economies of Central Asia due to their underdeveloped ￿nancial
sectors and weak monetary transmission channels. The effect of dollarization on monetary stability
and monetary policy depends on its size and substitutability between foreign and local currencies, and
the development of ￿nancial sectors.
Numerous studies have examined currency substitution in developing and transition economies.
Some authors base their studies on the so-called portfolio balance model, where agents allocate their
wealth in domestic and foreign money, and domestic and foreign bonds. A linear demand for money
and foreign money is then estimated using a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression or
other appropriate empirical methodology. The demand for foreign currency as a measure of currency
substitution is represented as a function of interest rates on domestic and foreign bonds and other
variables. KomÆrek and Meleck￿ (2003) apply this approach to the case of the Czech economy.
Mongardini and Mueller (1999) examine currency substitution in the Kyrgyz economy. More recently,
Harrison and Vymyatnina (2007) have used this methodology to study currency substitution in Russia.
Other authors employ a dynamic optimization framework with a money-in-the-utility model with
3two currencies. In this literature, estimation of the structural parameters is based on estimating the
Euler equations derived from the optimality conditions. This approach allows for explicit estimation
of the main parameters of the model such as the level of dollarization, the elasticity of substitution
between the domestic and foreign currency, as well as the magnitude of relative risk aversion and
intertemporal substitution. Estimation of the non-linear equations is performed using a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) framework. This approach was employed by ￿ Imrohoro￿ glu (1994), who
examines currency substitution in Canada, and Bufman and Leiderman (1992), who use a model
of the same type to investigate currency substitution in Israel. In the case of transition economies, a
similar framework can be found in Friedman and Verbetsky (2001), who study the economy of Russia,
and Sel￿uk (2003), who investigates currency substitution in some economies of Central and Eastern
Europe ￿ the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic.
In the present study, the second methodology is used. The value added of this approach is that
by explicitly estimating the parameters of the model, the implications of dollarization for seigniorage
revenues and households’ welfare can be analyzed. Bufman and Leiderman (1992) examine how
changes in the level of dollarization affect the seigniorage revenue of the Israeli government, while
Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) examine seigniorage loss and changes in economic welfare due to
changes in dollarization in the Russian economy. In the present study, this approach will be used to
examine three Central Asian economies.
3 Institutional Framework and Currency Substitution in Central Asia
The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s led to a deep socio-economic
crisis in Central Asia: a severe output decline, general macroeconomic instability, and hyperin￿ation.
Economic relations with other republics in the FSU were demolished.This had a negative impact on
living standards and caused a deep recession in the economies of the region.9
Although the beginning of the transformation process appeared to be a painful experience for
the countries of Central Asia, they managed to restore positive economic growth in the late 1990s
and have even demonstrated impressive growth rates in the 2000s.High prices for hydrocarbons,
rapid structural reforms, large in￿ows of foreign investments, and political stability have spurred the
economy of Kazakhstan and improved considerably the living standards in this country in recent years.
High energy prices and increasing investments in the oil and gas sectors were the main factors that
drove economic growth in Kazakhstan.10 Two other economies have experienced relatively modest
developments in comparison to their big neighbor. Kyrgyz Republic’s growth was driven mainly by
gold production and investments in the gold sector, while the economy of Tajikistan could only start
to recover from its recession at the end of the last decade due to the civil war that persisted even after
9See Pomfret (2006)
10IMF Staff estimates that in Kazakhstan oil accounts for more than 50 percent of exports and 40 percent of government
revenues. (IMF Country Report, 2009)
4the peace accord was signed in 1997. Real economic recovery could only start in 2000.11
A period of hyperin￿ation in the ￿rst half of the 1990s was a consequence of price liberalization
and overall economic decontrol in Central Asian countries. Moreover, newly established central
banks were heavily ￿nancing state enterprises’ losses and government de￿cits. A rapid growth in
money supply contributed to high levels of in￿ation in all countries. With the introduction of national
currencies, the central banks in the region gradually took control of prices and could achieve price
stability by the end of the 1990s. Economic developments of the 2000s stimulated rapid developments
in the ￿nancial markets in Central Asian states. Large in￿ows of capital and foreign exchange
into these economies in the form of export receipts, remittances, foreign direct investment, and
external borrowing by banks have supported economic growth and ￿nancial markets developments.
Remittances have recently developed into an important source of foreign exchange for the Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan.12 They have contributed to growth and poverty reduction, but also have
turned into a policy challenge. One of the issues arising from large in￿ows of remittances is that
the latter contribute to the growing in￿ow of foreign currency in the Central Asian economies that is
beyond the control of monetary authorities.13
Central banks in the region have recently gained more importance and control and the framework
of monetary policy has evolved over the period of transition in these economies. In the earlier
period, central banks’ policies were characterized by targeting money growth by means of conducting
a tight monetary policy to take control of in￿ation through managing the money supply. As local
currencies continued depreciating in the late 1990s, the countries’ policy makers became concerned
with the external balances and the stability of local money relative to major currencies (mainly the
U.S. dollar). Gradual liberalization of exchange rate regimes and capital account caused higher
volatility of the exchange rates. An important means of supporting stable exchange rates proved
to be foreign exchange interventions. Thus, the monetary policy framework became more concerned
with exchange rate stability. The instruments employed by central bankers together with the monetary
policy framework, have been evolving over the last several years, yet the most effective instrument
remains interventions in the foreign exchange markets and control over the money supply. At this
stage of development, currency substitution might largely impede the effects of the monetary policy
in Central Asian economies, as large amounts of foreign currency in circulation increase the part
of money supply that is not under the control of central banks. As this affects domestic money
demand, exchange rates become more volatile.14 Such instruments as of￿cial interest rates have
11See Pomfret (2006)
12IMF Country Report (2007) estimates that Tajikistan has one of the highest remittances to GDP ratio among former
FSU economies.
13IMF Regional Outlook (September 2006) analyzes remittances in￿ows in the region of Central Asia. IMF staff states
that remittances discourage domestic saving because they are used to ￿nance consumption and housing construction rather
than for investing in productive capacity. Moreover, remittances in￿ows might contribute to exchange rate appreciation and
fuel in￿ation.
14Onemightarguethatmoneygrowthtargetingandexchangerateinterventionsarenotimportantinstrumentsofmonetary
policy in developed and advanced transition economies. Today, central bankers can use interest rate setting and in￿ation
5limited ef￿ciency due to thin ￿nancial sectors and underdeveloped ￿nancial intermediation.
It is worth reiterating the motives to hold foreign currency in the three economies. First of
all, a memory of macroeconomic instability and high in￿ation explains people’s concern about the
stability of local currencies. This is particularly true for Tajikistan, where actual macroeconomic
stabilization started only in the 2000s. In Kyrgyz Republic, some political unrest in 2005 followed
by a revolution undermined the building sentiment of credit to national policies and added to the
feeling of uncertainty about future economic developments. Second, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan
remain among the countries with the lowest income per capita. Labor emigration is a widespread
phenomenon in these countries. Thus, remittances constitute an important source of foreign currency
in circulation. Furthermore, underdeveloped ￿nancial markets and a lack of con￿dence in local
banking institutions hinders households from taking their foreign cash holdings to a bank. In Kyrgyz
Republic, for example, only 5 percent of the population have a bank account. A similar situation can
be attributed to Tajikistan. In Tajikistan, the situation is aggravated by the considerable size of the
shadow economy (due to drug traf￿cking), where monetary transactions are most probably performed
in a foreign currency.15
The situation in Kazakhstan differs as this country has a lot more developed ￿nancial markets and
a high income per capita. Integration into world ￿nancial markets, presence of foreign banks and oil
dependence do however constitute the factors that drive dollarisation though in a slightly different
form, that is ￿nancial dollarisation. This situation re￿ects importance of foreign currency in economic
transactions in Kazakhstan.
4 A Model of Currency Substitution
The model presented in this section is based on a standard money-in-the-utility function model
with two currencies. This framework has been employed by several other studies which examine
substitution between domestic and foreign currencies in different countries.16 The model represents a
situation in which residents hold foreign currency as a simple and natural hedge against local in￿ation
due to the motives and contexts described in the previous section. The foreign currency is thus
assumed to be stable and trustworthy. In fact, in Central Asian economies, foreign currency is easily
disposable and very often held as a store of value, i.e. the foreign currency yields utility in terms of
households’ con￿dence towards the latter. Local and foreign currencies can be easily exchanged in
the market at the market exchange rate. The model is rather standardized and simpli￿ed. There is no
production activity in the economy. Agents receive an endowment every period that constitutes their
targeting frameworks to achieve their goals. The practice, however, shows that the monetary authorities in the economies of
Central Asia continue to rely heavily on foreign exchange interventions to provide price and exchange rate stability.
15Pomfret (2006) estimates trade in drugs and weapons to account for around 30-50% of all economic activity in
Tajikistan.
16See ￿ Imrohoro￿ glu (1994), Bufman and Leiderman (1993), Friedman and Verbetsky (2001), Sel￿uk (2006)
6wealth together with holdings of real balances that are unspent in the previous period, the interest rate
earned on the bond, and a lump-sum transfer from the government.
The economy consists of a continuum of in￿nitely lived identical individuals with total measure
one. A representative agent is assumed to derive utility from the consumption of a single good and
from the liquidity services provided by holdings of domestic and foreign money. Thus, an agent





where ￿ is the discount factor and c is consumption, and x denotes liquidity holdings. Money
services are produced by using a combination of domestic and foreign real balances in a CES
production function:
x = [(1 ￿ ￿)m￿￿ + ￿m￿￿￿]
￿ 1
￿ (2)
where m denotes domestic real money balances and m￿ denotes foreign money balances.
Coef￿cient ￿ is a share of foreign money balances in producing money services. Parameter ￿ is
used to compute the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign currency, and represents
the substitutability between the two currencies. The money services part of the utility function re￿ects
the willingness of residents to diversify their money holdings portfolio to lower the risk of losing their
monetary assets due to economic instability and in￿ation in the home country. The foreign country
is assumed to be more stable in an economic sense, i.e. its in￿ation rate is zero or lower than in the
domestic economy. The budget constraint of a representative household is as follows:
ct + mt + m￿











where rt is a nominal interest rate on one period bonds between period t ￿ 1 and t. Variables ￿t
and ￿t represent the in￿ation rate and rate of depreciation of the national currency, respectively. The
nominal exchange rate is the ratio between the domestic price level and foreign price level: Et = Pt
P￿
t :
The residents care about the stability of the exchange rate and the relative value of the domestic
currency to foreign currency. As they assume that the foreign currency is more stable, holding it
gives them a certain con￿dence about conserving the value of their monetary assets. Each period
every individual receives an endowment y; and a lump-sum transfer from the government ￿:Moreover,
agents hold ￿nancial assets b; that give the nominal interest rate rt between period t and t + 1:






























Euler equation (4) is the standard condition for optimal allocation of consumption between periods
t and t + 1. It equates the marginal utility cost of giving up one unit of consumption in period t to
the expected utility gain from shifting that unit to consumption in the next period. Equations (5) and
(6) equate the expected utility costs and bene￿ts of reducing consumption in the current period by one
unit and allocating that unit to money holdings and then to consumption in the next period.
To estimate the model and analyze the implications for seigniorage revenue and welfare cost of






t )1￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
; (7)
where xt is represented by equation (2).
It is assumed that the coef￿cient ￿ lies in the interval between 0 and 1, and re￿ects the transaction
requirement of money, and parameter ￿ represents the coef￿cient of relative risk aversion (RRA) and
should be positive. The situation ￿ = 1 is considered as a logarithmic speci￿cation of the utility
function. The parameter ￿ measures the degree of currency substitution and should be more than ￿1.
Then the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign money is computed as 1=(1 + ￿):
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￿ 1 = 0:



































































































































The utility function in equation (7) can be considered a special case of the utility function with




t ]1￿￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
; (14)
where an introduced parameter ￿ measures the intensity of habit persistence in the consumption
decision of the agent. If ￿ > 0; the model exhibits habit formation in a traditional sense. In this case,
the larger the ￿; the less pleasure from a given amount of consumption, and the larger must be the
purchases to generate the same utility. In the case when ￿ < 0; the household’s decisions are subject
to durability in the sense that not only current, but also past consumption generates utility. ct￿1 is the
"habit stock", i.e. the reference level to which the consumer compares her current consumption level.
9When ￿ = 0; habits do not play any role and the consumer cares only about her present consumption
level. If ￿ = 1; habits are very strong and consumer derives utility only from consumption growth rate.
Underhabitpersistence, anincreaseincurrentconsumptionlowersthemarginalutilityofconsumption
in the current period and increases it in the next period. The derived estimation equations for the case
when ￿ 6= 0 are presented in Appendix C. In this study, habit formation in consumption is introduced
to improve the ￿t of the theoretical model.
5 Data and Estimation Procedure
The GMM procedure is applied to estimate the system of equations derived in the previous section.
This procedure was developed by Hansen (1982) who formulated the estimation problem as follows.17
Let wt be an (h ￿ 1) vector of variables that are observed at date t; let ￿ denote an unknown (a￿1)
vector of coef￿cients, and let h(￿;wt) be an (r ￿ 1) vector-valued function, h: (Ra ￿ Rh) ! Rr:
Since wt is a random variable, so is h(￿;wt). Let ￿0 denote the true value of ￿; and the true value is
characterized by the property that
E fh(￿0;wt)g = 0: (15)
Further, denote YT ￿ (w0
T;w0
T￿1;:::;w0
1)0 be a (Th ￿ 1) vector containing all the observations in







The idea of the GMM is to choose ￿ so as to make the sample moment g(￿;YT) as close as possible
to the population moment of zero. Thus, the GMM estimator ^ ￿T is the value of ￿ that minimizes the
scalar:
Q(￿;YT) = [g(￿;YT)]
0 WT [g(￿;YT)]; (17)
where fWTg
1
T=1 is a sequence of (r ￿ r) positive de￿nite weighting matrices which may be
a function of YT:Hansen (1982) describes this procedure for obtaining a consistent and ef￿cient
estimator for WT.
Inthepresentstudy, theunknownparameterstobeestimatedaredenotedas￿1 = (￿;￿;￿;￿;￿)0 or
￿2 = (￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿)0. To account for endogeneity it is necessary to use instruments. The instruments
used are the lagged values of the variables in the estimated equations18:
17Procedure description follows Hamilton (1994).
18Lagged values of the explanatory variables represent good instruments to use in GMM estimation. This type of



















The monthly data used for estimation span from 2000 to 2008 in the case of Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic, and from 2002 to 2008 for Tajikistan.
The variables employed include consumer price indices (CPI), nominal exchange rates of national
currencies to the U.S. dollar, interest rates, industrial production volume or average real wages as a
proxy for consumption, and data on deposits in the second-tier banks. The data on deposits include
deposits denominated in foreign and local currencies and is used as a proxy for foreign and domestic
money balances respectively.
The data on interest rates include the of￿cial rates of central banks, deposit rates, lending
rates, money market rates, and a Federal Funds rate of the Fed. The main sources of the data are
central banks and statistical of￿ces of these countries, and the IMF International Financial Statistics
database.19
6 Empirical Results
The estimation results for each country are reported in Table 1. Results are reported for different
interest rates. In each case, the minimal value of the objective function JT is presented in the table as
well. This is a chi-square test statistic for the validity of the model’s overidentifying restrictions.
Table 1 presents results for the case of utility function without habit formation in consumption.
The parameter estimates for ￿ are economically meaningful and are below unity for every country.
Thus, households in these economies value future consumption less than consumption in the present
period. In some cases, the value of ￿ is less than the value of 0.98 usually assumed in the economic
literature. In Tajikistan, ￿ is less than 0.9 for those cases when re￿nance and interbank rates are used
in the estimation. This result might suggest that the residents in these economies are very "present-
oriented" and put less value on future consumption. This might also be due to the data on interest rate
dynamics. The values of the estimates for ￿ vary from 0.01 to 0.18 among countries depending on
the choice of interest rate. Thus, the share of money in providing utility is signi￿cantly lower than the
share of consumption. This result is in line with other similar studies. The share of foreign money
holdings in providing monetary services ￿ is estimated between 0.47 and 0.62. This implies quite high
ef￿ciency of foreign money and therefore a high level of currency substitution in all three economies.
The elasticity of substitution parameter s is of particular interest. It is assumed to be positive
and Singleton (1982), Eckstein and Leiderman (1992), ￿ Imrohoro￿ glu (1994) and others. Fuhrer, Moore and Schuh (1995)
analyze the quality of the instruments used in the GMM estimation and state that the GMM estimates are biased in small
samples and this bias persists even in large samples due to irrelevance of the instrumental variables. Therefore, the authors
propose using lagged values of the variables as instruments and argue that the lags are usually well-correlated with the
right-hand side variables and should represent a solution to the problem associated with poor instrument relevance.
19A more detailed desciption of the data can be found in Table A 1 in Appendix A.
11from 0 to in￿nity. If it equals 0, then the two currencies are complements, but if it is more than 0,
then there is substitutability between the two currencies. ￿ Imrohoro￿ glu (1994) studied dollarization in
Canada and ￿nds that the elasticity of substitution between the U.S. dollar and the Canadian dollar
is less than 1. The author explains that this implies little substitution between the two currencies,
as the implicit demand for the U.S. dollar does not appear to be responsive to the relative currency
price. In the studies by Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) and Sel￿uk (2006) the elasticity is found to
be greater than 1. In the present study the elasticity of substitution between the U.S. dollar and local
currencies signi￿cantly exceeds 1 several times. In the manner of Imrohoroglu (1994), this implies
that holding foreign currency is highly responsive to the relative currency price in Central Asia. In
the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, ￿ was estimated between -0.31 and -0.94, which implies that the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign currencies s = 1
(1+￿) is between 1.45 and 17.
The parameter estimates for ￿ could only be estimated in the restricted range of values for Kazakhstan
when habit formation in consumption is assumed. These results show that the two currencies are very
good substitutes in the Central Asian states, and residents can easily switch from one currency to the
other.
Finally, the RRA parameter ￿ could not be estimated precisely in most cases and its estimates
were sometimes negative. The negative parameter of relative risk aversion implies non-convexity of
preferences, which poses a dif￿culty in interpreting the model. The problem of negative values of
RRA parameters and imprecision of its estimates has been studied in the economic literature.20 This
discussion is, however, beyond the subject of the present study.
The J-test statistic for testing the overidentifying restrictions of the model indicate that the data
provide support for the considered model, or in other words that the overidentifying restrictions are
valid.21 The null hypothesis of validity of overidentifying restrictions could not be rejected in any of
the considered cases. Hence, the instruments chosen proved to be valid.
20Negative and sometimes statistically insigni￿cant values of the estimated parameter of relative risk aversion (RRA) and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) have been obtained and discussed to different extents in studies on consumption
behavior through estimating the Euler equations by GMM. See, for example, Hansen and Singleton (1982), Hall (1988),
Mao (1990), Holman (1998) and others. In his study, Pozzi (2002) proposed an explanation for the imprecision in estimating
the RRA parameter and its estimates’ negative values.
21Since the number of orthogonality conditions exceeds the number of parameters, the validity of overidentifying
restrictions should be tested. The test suggested is a JT test, where JT statistics is a minimized value of the objective
function times the number of observations. Under the null hypothesis the overidentifying restrictions are valid, and the
JT￿statistics is asymptotically distributed as ￿
2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions.
12Table 1. GMM Estimates (No Habit Formation)
a)Kazakhstan
Re￿nance rate Treasury bill Deposit rate FFR
￿ 0.92***(0.00) 0.96***(0.00) 0.97***(0.00) 0.98***(0.00)
￿ 0.51***(0.01) 0.52***(0.01) 0.51***(0.01) 0.53***(0.01)
￿ 0.18***(0.01) 0.11***(0.00) 0.08***(0.01) 0.06***(0.00)
￿ -0.16* (0.09) -0.05 (0.06) -0.13 (0.07) 0.04 (0.03)
￿ -1.13***(0.03) -1.14*** (0.05) -1.18***(0.04) -1.16***(0.07)
J ￿ statistics 8.42 [0.59] 7.11 [0.71] 7.99 [0.63] 7.90 [0.64]
No:obs 105 105 105 105
b)Kyrgyz Republic
Repo rate MMR Deposit rate FFR
￿ 0.95*** (0.00) 0.96***(0.01) 0.94***(0.00) 0.99***(0.00)
￿ 0.55***(0.01) 0.56***(0.01) 0.56***(0.01) 0.62***(0.03)
￿ 0.05*** (0.00) 0.06***(0.00) 0.06***(0.00) 0.02***(0.00)
￿ 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.08) 0.005 (0.03) -0.04 (0.01)
￿ -0.76***(0.08) -0.72*** (0.08) -0.67***(0.06) -0.31*(0.17)
J ￿ statistics 5.87 [0.75] 6.60 [0.68] 6.16 [0.72] 5.91 [0.75]
No:obs 94 90 95 95
c)Tajikistan
Re￿nance rate Interbank rate Deposit rate FFR
￿ 0.89***(0.00) 0.89***(0.00) 0.92***(0.00) 0.98***(0.00)
￿ 0.54***(0.00) 0.53***(0.00) 0.53***(0.01) 0.47***(0.01)
￿ 0.08***(0.00) 0.07***(0.00) 0.06***(0.00) 0.01***(0.00)
￿ 0.05 (0.04) 0.07** (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.00)
￿ -0.69*** (0.01) -0.68*** (0.02) -0.70*** (0.01) -0.94***(0.03)
J ￿ statistics 5.63 [0.86] 5.26 [0.87] 4.97 [0.89] 5.78 [0.83]
No:obs 71 61 71 71
Notes: a) Standard errors are in parentheses; P-values are in brackets; b) ￿￿discount factor, ￿￿ share of
foreign money balances in producing money services; s= 1
(1+￿)￿elasticity of currency substitution
13Table C 1 in Appendix C presents the results for the case of Kazakhstan when the utility function
assumed exhibits habit formation, or the parameter of habit persistence ￿ 6= 0. In the case of
Kazakhstan, this speci￿cation helped restore the meaningful values of the parameter ￿: For the other
two countries, the introduction of habit persistence does not change the magnitude of the major
parameters in most cases. In Kazakhstan, consumption exhibits a strong persistence with the values
of ￿ = 0:78. The values of ￿ vary between -0.70 and -0.87, indicating that substitutability between
national and foreign currencies is very high. The estimates of RRA coef￿cient ￿ are again negative.
The share of dollars in providing money transactions is 0.5. This result con￿rms the previous
speci￿cation results on effective foreign currency and high substitutability between domestic and
foreign currencies in Kazakhstan. J-statistics values cannot reject the validity of the overidentifying
restrictions, i.e. the model provides a good ￿t for the data.
In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, the value of the parameter ￿ was estimated at a lower level
than in the ￿rst model speci￿cation. A strong habit persistence was found in this country as well. The
parameter measuring habit formation ￿ = 0:7: The elasticity of substitution between the currencies
remains high. In Tajikistan, the habit formation parameter values vary from negative to positive
numbers depending on the interest rate chosen.
Empirical results in this section provide strong support for the presence of currency substitution in
the economies of Central Asia, and highlight the role of foreign currency as a substitute for domestic
money in economic transactions.
7 Implications for Seigniorage Revenue
One of the major concerns for policy makers related to currency substitution is its effect on the
seigniorage revenue of central banks. Of￿cial dollarization, or full replacement of the domestic
currency by some foreign currency (for example, the U.S. dollar), thus directly affects the ability
of the government to earn revenue from issuing money. Partial, or unof￿cial dollarization, can affect
seigniorage revenue as well. Some have argued that this effect may be of large.22 In the context of
transition and developing economies, then, the loss of seigniorage revenue is an important issue.23
In this study, the implications for seigniorage revenue are derived from analyzing a hypothetical
steady state of the model. Steady states with different in￿ation rates (￿) and dollarization (￿) are
22Bufman and Leiderman (1992) studied currency substitution in Israel and showed that even small increases in
dollarization can have signi￿cant effect on the seigniorage income of the monetary authorities. Friedman and Verbetsky
(2001) examined seigniorage loss for the case of Russia.
23Fischer (1982), for example, calculates average seigniorage rates during the 1960s and 1970s for a cross-section of
countries and ￿nds that seigniorage accounts for more than 10% of total government revenue in many less developed
countries, especially those with high in￿ation rates. Click (1998) reports average seigniorage as a share of government
spending for a set of 90 countries. He ￿nds that the seigniorage revenue share ranges from 5% in Honduras to 62% in
Argentina. Lange and Sauer (2005) calculated the seigniorage for the period 1995 till 2000 for 15 Latin American countries,
and found that seigniorage accounts for almost 12 % of government revenue in these economies even though in￿ation rates
were reduced in the 1990s.
14compared. In the steady state, consumption and real money balances’ holdings grow at some constant
rate ￿ > 0: The population grows at the rate n = 0: The real return on the market portfolio, R, is
invariant with respect to both time and in￿ation rate. Under these conditions, the steady state demand
for domestic real money balances can be derived using the optimality conditions from equations 8 to
10. First, the expression for the ratio between foreign and domestic real money balances in terms of





























where the notations from Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) are used for simpli￿cation: Rb =
(1 + R)=(1 + ￿); 1 + R = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿)￿=￿; Rm = 1=(1 + ￿) and Rmf = (1 + ￿)=(1 + ￿):
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where ￿ is a parameter of habit persistence.24
The money growth rule is assumed as follows:
Mt = (1 + ￿)Mt￿1; (21)
where ￿ is the growth rate of the domestic money supply.
For simplicity, the government’s budget constraint is assumed to be:
Mt = Mt￿1 ￿ Tt; (22)
The ￿scal policy assumed implies that the government rebates seigniorage revenues to the public
through lump-sum transfers Tt:
To compute the seigniorage, different approaches can be found in the literature. Here the
monetary concept of seigniorage computation is used due to the fact that dollarization affects to an
24The results of the simulated seigniorage-to-GDP ratio for the case of habit formation are presented in Appendix C.
15important extent the ability of the central bank to receive revenue from increasing the money supply.
Furthermore, this approach is suitable for calculating seigniorage revenue in the framework of the
present model’s setup and is simple in computation.25









where Mt is the monetary base, St is the seigniorage revenue and Yt is GDP. Therefore, the

















where m is the steady state per capita real money balances and y is the per capita GDP. The









For the calculation of seigniorage loss the values of the parameters are calibrated on the basis
of the estimation results in the previous section. The following values are assumed: ￿ = 0:07 and
￿ = 0:98:The parameter ￿ will be given values from 0:4 to 0:7, and ￿ is assumed to be ￿0:7. The
ratio of consumption over income is assumed to be 0:8.26 The RRA parameter ￿ is assumed to be
0, since it was not estimated precisely and its estimated value was negative in some cases. In the
25Though monetary de￿nition of seigniorage is the most widespread concept of seigniorage, other de￿nitions can be
found in the recent literauture. Fiscal seigniorage refers to the yield on the counterparts of the monetary base after deduction




where i is a market interest rate, M is a monetary base and P is a price level.
Under rational in￿ation expectations, the Fischer equation implies that opportunity seigniorage can be calculated as
follows:
S = (￿ + r)
M
P ,











where ￿ is the growth rate of base money. Assuming that velocity and the money multiplier are constant, the quantity
theory of money implies that money growth equals the sum of the in￿ation rate (￿) and the real economic growth rate (g):
S = (￿ + g)
M
P :




26This is an average ratio of consumption to GDP or total income across three countries and the period.
16steady state, the growth rate of money ￿ is equal to the steady state in￿ation rate ￿:The underlying
assumption of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is used to consider two scenarios of the domestic
currency depreciation. In the ￿rst scenario, I assume that the foreign in￿ation rate ￿￿ = 0 while
the domestic in￿ation rate changes from 0.2 to 50 percent. In this scenario, the depreciation rate, ￿t
moves together with the domestic in￿ation rate and ￿ = ￿: In the second scenario, the foreign in￿ation
rate is constant but equals 5 percent. This scenario implies that the domestic currency depreciates at a
slower rate than does the domestic in￿ation rate.
Table 2 presents the results of the seigniorage revenue simulation. The simulated values are
presented as the ratio to GDP in percent. This ratio was calculated for different values of the domestic
in￿ation rate ￿ and for different values of the share of foreign money balances ￿:
The results in Table 2 (a) show that the ratio of seigniorage-to-GDP ratio increases with the rate of
in￿ation, but only to a certain level of the in￿ation rate. The seigniorage revenue reaches its peak when
the in￿ation rate is 2 percent in the case when the dollarization level ￿ = 0:4. After that it gradually
decreases. This result is similar to those obtained by Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) who found that
the government achieves its highest seigniorage revenue at an in￿ation rate of 1-3 percent depending
on the level of dollarization. More important is the relation between dollarization and seigniorage
revenue. The results show that the latter is a decreasing function of dollarization. The higher ￿ is, the
lower is the seigniorage revenue-to-GDP ratio.
In scenario 2, if the dollarization level is 0.4, the seigniorage revenue increases until the in￿ation
rate reaches 5 percent. In this scenario, the ratio of government revenue from seigniorage to GDP is
higher than in the ￿rst scenario for each level of dollarization and each in￿ation rate. The agents prefer
to hold more domestic money when there is in￿ation abroad. Moreover, they hold more domestic
currency when the domestic in￿ation rate is lower than the foreign in￿ation rate. From equation 18, it
can be seen that if consumption is constant, the demand for domestic money balances will be higher
when there is in￿ation in the foreign country. Results from the second scenario thus support the
previous ￿nding that seigniorage revenue is a decreasing function of the level of dollarization. In this
scenario, however, the seigniorage-to-GDP ratio is less sensitive to the increases in dollarization.
17Table 2. Simulated Seigniorage/GDP Ratios (%)
a) Scenario 1: ￿ = ￿(￿￿ = 0%)
￿;% ￿
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.2 0.48 0.28 0.11 0.03
0.5 0.98 0.53 0.19 0.05
1.0 1.42 0.67 0.22 0.05
2.0 1.58 0.61 0.18 0.04
3.0 1.41 0.48 0.14 0.03
4.0 1.19 0.38 0.10 0.02
5.0 0.98 0.30 0.08 0.02
6.0 0.82 0.24 0.06 0.014
8.0 0.59 0.16 0.04 0.010
10 0.44 0.12 0.03 0.007
20 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.003
30 0.09 0.02 0.006 0.001
50 0.05 0.01 0.003 0.0008
b) Scenario 2: ￿￿ = 5%
￿;% ￿
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.2 0.62 0.59 0.49 0.28
0.5 1.36 1.27 1.01 0.52
1.0 2.25 2.03 1.48 0.66
2.0 3.30 2.75 1.67 0.60
3.0 3.83 2.91 1.51 0.48
4.0 4.07 2.81 1.28 0.37
5.0 4.15 2.61 1.07 0.29
6.0 4.11 3.37 0.90 0.24
8.0 3.86 1.91 0.65 0.16
10 3.51 1.53 0.48 0.12
20 2.03 0.65 0.18 0.04
30 1.31 0.38 0.10 0.02
50 0.76 0.21 0.06 0.01
Notes: ￿ = 0:98;￿ = 0:08;￿ = ￿0:7;￿ = 0;c=y = 0:8
18Introduction of a habit formation in consumption changes the numerical results of the seigniorage
computation, since the demand for real domestic money balances is represented by equation 21. If
the estimated value of ￿ is positive and ￿ > 0 but ￿ < ￿; then in the habit formation economy the
seigniorage-to-GDP ratio will be lower for every level of dollarization and for each in￿ation rate than
in the economy with no habit formation. Results of the simulated ratio of seigniorage revenue to GDP
for the utility function with habit formation are presented in Appendix C.
The ￿ndings in this section provide support for the hypothesis that decreasing seigniorage revenue
is due to increasing dollarization.
For further analysis, actual seigniorage-to-GDP ratios were calculated using data from the central
banks of the countries examined in the study. The actual seigniorage-to-GDP ratio was calculated
using data on the monetary base following the monetary seigniorage concept. Results are presented
in Table 3. Both simulated and actual ratio of seigniorage to GDP decrease when the dollarization
level ￿ increases. There is, however, no signi￿cant variation in actual annual seigniorage revenue over
time.
19Table 3. Actual and Simulated Seigniorage/GDP Ratios (in %)
a)Kazakhstan
Period In￿ation rate Dollarization Simulated Actual
(in%) level, ￿ seigniorage/GDP ratio seigniorage/GDP ratio
2000 13 0.51 0.07 0.05
2001 8 0.64 0.02 0.05
2002 6 0.60 0.06 0.05
2003 6 0.47 0.35 0.06
2004 7 0.43 0.48 0.08
2005 8 0.42 0.46 0.06
2006 9 0.35 0.94 0.096
2007 11 0.32 1.07 0.07
b)Kyrgyz Republic
Period In￿ation rate Dollarization Simulated Actual
(in%) level, ￿ seigniorage/GDP ratio seigniorage/GDP ratio
2000 19 0.58 0.02 0.014
2001 7 0.59 0.06 0.005
2002 2 0.62 0.14 0.002
2003 3 0.64 0.08 0.003
2004 4 0.70 0.02 0.005
2005 4 0.73 0.01 0.005
2006 6 0.66 0.03 0.009
2007 10 0.52 0.09 0.0016
c)Tajikistan
Period In￿ation rate Dollarization Simulated Actual
(in%) level, ￿ seigniorage/GDP ratio seigniorage/GDP ratio
2002 12.3 0.49 0.10 0.01
2003 16.3 0.49 0.07 0.01
2004 7.1 0.60 0.05 0.003
2005 7.1 0.56 0.09 0.003
2006 10 0.70 0.007 0.004
2007 13.1 0.75 0.002 0.015
This implies that actual seigniorage revenues were quite stable over the period considered. Time
aggregation in calculating the seigniorage revenue might generate more variability in the seigniorage
revenues of the local governments. Nevertheless, the results of the present section support the negative
relationship between the revenue that central banks derive from money issuance and the amount of
foreign money holdings by the residents. A simple correlation analysis shows that the correlation
between dollarization level ￿ and simulated and actual seigniorage-to-GDP ratios is around -0.82 and
-0.71 respectively.
208 Economic Welfare and Dollarization
By affecting the seigniorage revenues of the government and thus the amount of lump-sum transfers
paid to the public, currency substitution impacts the welfare of households. It is important to note that
dollarization itself stems from several factors that have an effect on economic welfare, i.e. high rates
of in￿ation, rapid depreciation of domestic money, etc. These factors stimulate dollarization because
economic agents aim to hedge the value of their ￿nancial assets and money holdings by switching to
foreign currency. Holding foreign money thus becomes a way for households to preserve their wealth.
In this section, the potential implications of dollarization and currency substitution for welfare
are discussed. These implications involve the different channels through which holding of foreign
money balances by households can affect their welfare. This analysis, though cumbersome, yields
some important insights on the economic role of dollarization in transition economies.
The baseline assumption is that the welfare of a household changes if dollarization ￿ increases,
i.e. ￿0 < ￿1 and u(￿0) > u(￿1): To calculate the welfare costs of dollarization in a steady state with
a given rate of in￿ation, one needs to compute the percentage decrease in consumption per capita that
would generate the same welfare change as that from moving from the original level of dollarization
￿0 to a higher level of dollarization ￿1: Or it is necessary to ￿nd such ￿c that would return the
household to its original level of utility: u(c;￿0) = u(c + ￿c;￿1). For this purpose, the utility












where h = m￿
m : Plugging in the expression for h from equation 17, and equating utilities for



































































































































































































To compute consumption compensation, the money demand expression from equation 18 is
plugged into equation 26. Derived consumption compensation in equation 27 consists of two parts:
a decrease in the lump-sum transfer from the government due to its loss of seigniorage revenue, and
direct changes in households’ utility due to holding foreign money.
Using the same parameter values as in the calculation of seigniorage loss in the previous section,
the consumption compensation is calculated using equation 27. The welfare loss is computed for a
change in dollarization ￿ from 0:5 to 0:6 for different rates of in￿ation. Two scenarios of exchange
rate determination from the previous section are analyzed. Table 4 presents the results of the
simulated changes in welfare represented as percentage in GDP. Negative values of the consumption
compensation imply welfare gains, while positive values imply welfare loss.
22Table 4. Consumption Compensation for Increasing Dollarization
￿;% ￿C/GDP, %














Notes: ￿ changes from 0.5 to 0.6, ￿ = 0:98;￿ = ￿0:7;￿ = 0:08;c=y = 0:8
The results in Table 4 reveal that dollarization in fact brings gains in welfare that can be as large
as 1.65 percent of GDP if the domestic in￿ation rate reaches 50 percent. The welfare gain is an
increasing function of in￿ation. This ￿nding can be explained by the fact that an increase in foreign
money holdings hedges households from incurring loss due to depreciating domestic money. The
higher the in￿ation rate, the higher the gain from an increase in foreign currency holdings. This also
implies that the loss in seigniorage revenue due to increasing dollarization is exceeded by the gains
from holding foreign currency. In the second scenario, holding foreign money brings welfare loss if
the domestic in￿ation rate is lower than the in￿ation rate in the foreign economy. In this scenario,
holding dollars is not optimal since the domestic currency is stronger when foreign in￿ation exceeds
in￿ation at home. Thus, the welfare loss occurs due to uncertainty about the foreign in￿ation rate and
about the exchange rate between local and foreign currencies. The seigniorage loss is greater than the
gain in household consumption as a result of switching to foreign currency. Hence, dollarization in an
in￿ationary environment with depreciating local currency vis-￿-vis foreign currency becomes welfare
generating. Currency substitution is thus a transitory phenomenon that might result in negative as
well as positive changes in welfare. The welfare cost depends on the ability of resident households
to diversify their money holdings in such a way as to avoid the risk of sudden depreciation of either
currency.
239 Conclusion
In the present study currency substitution in three transition countries of Central Asia was examined.
Findings show that foreign and domestic currencies are good substitutes in all three economies -
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. The elasticity of substitution between the two
currencies is more than unity in all cases. The share of foreign currency in providing money
services exceeds 0.5 for all three economies. Currency substitution and dollarization are shown to
be of signi￿cant magnitude and importance in these transition countries. The study was conducted
using a simple dynamic model of money-in-the-utility function with two currencies, where holding
money balances denominated in different currencies serves as a hedge against domestic instability
and in￿ation. The steady state implications for seigniorage revenues of the government and household
welfare were analyzed. Seigniorage revenue was found to be a decreasing function of dollarization.
An increase in dollarization index from 0.4 to 0.5, decreases seigniorage revenue to GDP ratio by
almost half. Seigniorage revenues will however depend on the in￿ation rate abroad. The higher the
in￿ation rate abroad, the higher is the seigniorage ratio in the domestic economy due to increasing
local demand for domestic real money balances. Increasing dollarization still results in loss of
seigniorage revenue for each dollarization level and in￿ation rate.
The welfare analysis comprises the loss of seigniorage and a change in welfare due to switching to
a foreign currency. The ￿ndings of the welfare analysis are sensitive to the scenario of domestic
currency depreciation. If foreign in￿ation is zero, then switching to holding dollars is a welfare
generating decision. Though the government loses its revenues from money issuance, the overall
effect of currency substitution can be positive. In the second scenario, where the foreign in￿ation
rate was ￿xed at 5 percent, holding dollars decreases households’ wealth if in￿ation in the home
country is lower than in￿ation abroad. Residents choose to hold foreign currency which in fact has
less purchasing power and depreciates at a higher rate than does the domestic currency. Once the
domestic in￿ation rate outpaces foreign in￿ation, switching to dollars starts bringing gains in welfare.
Dollarization thus affects household wealth from two sides: decreasing lump-sum transfers from the
government and hedging motives against domestic in￿ation.
Currency substitution and dollarization thus constitute transitory phenomena that do not
necessarily bring welfare loss. Governments willing to dedollarize local economies should be
concerned with the stability of local currencies rather than with restricting foreign money holdings.
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27Appendix A Data Description
Table A 1. Data Sources
Series Time span Source
a) Kazakhstan
Consumer Price Index 2000:1 - 2008:12 IMF
Deposits denominated in domestic 2000:1 - 2008:12 NBK
and foreign currency (in mln tenge)
Industrial Production (in mln. tenge) 2000:1 - 2008:12 Statistical Agency
of Kazakhstan
Re￿nancing Rate of the National Bank (in percent) 2000:1 - 2008:12 IMF
Treasury bill rate (in percent) 2000:1 - 2008:12 IMF
Average deposit rate (in percent) 2000:1 - 2008:12 NBK
Nominal exchange rate (tenge to US dollar) (in tenge) 2000:1 - 2008:12 IMF
b) Kyrgyz Republic
Consumer Price Index 2000:1 - 2008:3 IMF
Deposits denominated in domestic 2000:1 - 2008:3 NBKR
and foreign currency (in mln som)
Industrial Production (in mln. som) 2000:1 - 2008:3 Statistical Agency of
Kyrgyz Republic
Rate on repo operations of the NBKR 2000:1 - 2008:3 NBKR
Money market rate 2000:1 - 2008:3 IMF
Deposit rate 2000:1 - 2008:3 IMF
Nominal exchange rate (som to US dollar) (in som) 2000:1 - 2008:3 IMF
28c) Tajikistan
Consumer Price Index 2002:1 ￿ 2008:2 IMF
Deposits denominated in domestic 2002:1 ￿ 2008:2 NBT
and foreign currency (in mln somoni)
Industrial Production (in mln. somoni) 2002:1 ￿ 2008:2 NBT
Wages (in somoni) 2002:1 ￿ 2008:2 NBT
Of￿cial Rate of the NBT (in percent) 2002:1 ￿ 2008:2 NBT
Interbank Rate (in percent) 2002:1 ￿ 2007:3 NBT
Deposit Rate (in percent) 2002:1 ￿ 2008:2 IMF
Nominal exchange rate (somoni to US dollar) 2002:1 ￿ 2008:2 IMF
(in somoni)
Notes: NBK -National Bank of Kazakhstan, NBKR - National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic,
NBT - National Bank of Tajikistan
29Appendix B In￿ation and Dollarization
Table B 1. Capital In￿ows in Central Asia
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Remittances* (mln. USD)
Kazakhstan 122 171 205 147 166 178 187 223 192
Kyrgyz Republic 9 11 37 78 189 322 481 715 1232
Tajikistan ... ... 79 146 252 467 1019 1691 2544
FDI** (mln. USD)
Kazakhstan 1278 2861 2164 2213 5436 2123 6630 6900 10732
Kyrgyz Republic -7 -1 5 46 132 43 182 208 265
Tajikistan 24 10 36 32 272 55 66 160 190
Source: * World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2008.
Data retrieved from the website of the World Bank.
** EBRD Transition Report, 2008
Notes: Data for FDI in 2008 are estimates
30Figure B 1. In￿ation in Central Asia
Note: Figures for 2009 are estimates Source: EBRD Transition Report, 2008
Figure B 2. Dollarization in Central Asia
Note: Dollarization Index is computed as a ratio of foreign currency denominated deposits to total deposits
31Figure B 3. Exchange Rates: Units of Local Currency to U.S. Dollar
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics
32Appendix C Habit Formation in Consumption
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t (1 + ￿t+1) ￿ ￿
￿o
:
33Table C 1. GMM Estimates (Utility with Habit Formation in Consumption) for Kazakhstan
Re￿nance rate Treasury Bill Deposit Rate FFR
￿ 0.92***(0.00) 0.95***(0.00) 0.96***(0.00) 0.98***(0.00)
￿ 0.49***(0.00) 0.50***(0.00) 0.50***(0.00) 0.50***(0.00)
￿ 0.10***(0.00) 0.12***(0.01) 0.10***(0.01) 0.07***(0.01)
￿ -0.12***(0.01) -0.13***(0.01) -0.11***(0.01) -0.08***(0.01)
￿ 0.79***(0.00) 0.78***(0.01) 0.78***(0.03) 0.78***(0.01)
￿ -0.70***(0.06) -0.87***(0.02) -0.85***(0.02) -0.87***(0.02)
J ￿ statistics 8.49 [0.75] 7.28 [0.84] 7.28 [0.84] 7.85 [0.80]
No:obs 103 103 103 103
Notes: a) Standard errors are in parentheses; P-values are in brackets; b) ￿￿discount factor, ￿￿ share of
foreign money balances in producing money services; s= 1
1+￿￿elasticity of currency substitution
34Table C 2. Simulated Seigniorage/GDP Ratios (%)
Scenario 1: ￿ = ￿(￿￿ = 0%)
￿;% ￿
0.4 0.5 0.6
0.2 0.14 0.08 0.03
0.5 0.29 0.16 0.06
1.0 0.43 0.20 0.07
2.0 0.47 0.18 0.05
3.0 0.42 0.14 0.04
4.0 0.36 0.11 0.03
5.0 0.30 0.09 0.02
6.0 0.25 0.07 0.019
8.0 0.18 0.05 0.012
10 0.13 0.04 0.009
20 0.05 0.01 0.003
30 0.03 0.007 0.002
50 0.01 0.004 0.001
b) Scenario 2: ￿￿ = 5%
￿;% ￿
0.4 0.5 0.6
0.2 0.19 0.18 0.15
0.5 0.41 0.38 0.30
1.0 0.68 0.61 0.44
2.0 0.99 0.83 0.50
3.0 1.15 0.87 0.45
4.0 1.22 0.84 0.39
5.0 1.24 0.78 0.32
6.0 1.23 0.71 0.27
8.0 1.16 0.57 0.19
10 1.05 0.46 0.15
20 0.61 0.20 0.05
30 0.39 0.12 0.03
50 0.23 0.06 0.02
35Appendix D Derivation of the Estimated Equations






















s.t. the budget constraint
ct + mt + m￿







































































￿ ￿t = 0; (eq. A7)
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De￿ne h = m￿
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(eq. A9)











































































￿ 1 = 0 ,
37Plug the de￿nition of x into the equation, and take m out of the parentheses:
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As h = m￿
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This notation simpli￿es the representation while deriving the next estimation equation. Thus,
dividing the RHS term of eq. A11 by the RHS term of eq. A10 and equaling to the expression from
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1+￿
t ￿ ￿): (eq. A13)
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Derivation of the Demand for Domestic Real Money Balances




























































￿ ￿t = 0; (eq. A7)
We assume a hypothetical steady state, where real consumption (c) and real money holdings (x) grow
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where h = m￿
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(1 + ￿)
: (eq. A19)
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Following Friedman and Verbetsky (2001), we de￿ne the following terms:
Rb = (1 + R)=(1 + ￿); 1 + R = (1 + ￿)(1 + n)(1 + ￿)￿=￿; Rm = 1=(1 + ￿) and
Rmf = (1 + ￿)=(1 + ￿):
In this paper, I assume the population growth rate to equal 0. Following Walsh (2003), the steady
state in￿ation ￿ should be equal to the steady state money growth: First plugging the de￿ned terms
into the denominator of equation A21, we obtain:








1 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)￿￿Rmf




























































































































































To compute seigniorage loss, we need a de￿nition of seigniorage. Following Walsh (2003), the

















Assuming that money supply grows at the following rate:
43Mt = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿)(1 + n)Mt￿1 (eq. A24)









(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿)(1 + n)
￿
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(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿)(1 + n)
￿
(eq. A25)
Assuming that n=0, and in steady state Mt = (1 + ￿)(1 + n)(1 + ￿)Mt￿1; while 1 + ￿ = 1 + ￿, the












Now the seigniorage ratio can be calculated by plugging the expression for m from eq. A22.
Derivation of Welfare Loss
u(c;x) =










































To calculate the welfare costs of various steady state levels of in￿ation, we need to compute the
percentage decrease in consumption per capita that would generate the same welfare loss as that from
moving from the original level of dollarization ￿1 to a higher level of dollarization ￿2:
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